Vamık D. Volkan, M.D., DLFAPA, FACPsa.


Vamık D. Volkan
The term “chosen trauma” refers to the shared image of an event that causes a large group (i.e., ethnic group) to feel helpless, victimized and humiliated by another group. Of course, no group intends to be victimized, but it can “choose” to psychologize and to mythologize the event. When this occurs, the group carries the image of the event – along with associated shared feelings of hurt and shame and with the defenses against perceived shared conflicts they initiate – from generation to generation. During this transgenerational transmission, the image of the event emerges as a significant large-group marker; the group draws the shared image of the traumatic event into its very identity (Volkan 1975, 1997, 1999a, 1999b). In order to illustrate these two concepts, chosen trauma and transgenerational transmission, I turn my attention to Bosnia-Herzegovina after the collapse of communist Yugoslavia. Of course, what I present in this chapter is not a complete psychopolitical analysis of the situation in the former Yugoslavia; here I will focus only on a Serbian shared trauma that took place 600 years ago and some of its consequences in Bosnia in the early 1990s.

The historical psychological background to 1992:
After becoming independent from Byzantium in the twelfth century, the Kingdom of Serbia thrived for almost 200 years under the leadership of the Nemanjiæ dynasty, reaching its peak under the beloved Emperor Stefan Dušan. By the end of his twenty-four year reign, Serbia’s territory reached from the Croatian border in the north to the Aegean Sea in the south, from the Adriatic Sea in the west to Constantinople in the east. Dušan died in 1355, and the Nemanjiæ dynasty came to an end a short time thereafter. In 1371, Serbian feudal lords elected Lazar Hrebeljanoviæ as leader of Serbia, though he assumed the title of Prince or Duke rather than King or Emperor. The decline of Serbia that followed is primarily attributed to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into Serbian territory, culminating in the Battle of Kosovo on June 28, 1389, at the Kosovo Polje (the Field of the Black Birds). Despite a gap of some seventy years between the Battle of Kosovo and the total occupation of Serbia by the Ottoman Turks, the belief that the two events were coterminous gradually developed.

Thanks to recent works such as Emmert's (1990) we now have, in English, various versions of the historical "truth" of the Battle of Kosovo. We know that the Turkish Sultan Murad I, was fatally wounded by a Serbian assassin during or after the battle. We also know that either the wounded Sultan or his son Bayezid ordered the execution of Prince Lazar, the leader of the Serbian forces and their allies, who had been captured during the battle. Ottoman forces apparently returned to Adrianople (Edirne) after the Battle of Kosovo, and Lazar was succeeded by his son, Stefan Lazarevic, who reportedly became a close ally of Murad's successor. With heavy losses on both sides and the deaths of both leaders, many historians now consider the battle to have been essentially indecisive.

What is important in this case, however, as in others, is not the historical truth, but the impact of the shared mental image of the "chosen trauma" on a large group's identity. By the time that the Turks gained substantial control over Serbia – fully seventy years after Kosovo – the battle had slowly begun to evolve into a "chosen trauma"  for the Serbian people. There is ample evidence that the interpretation of events at the Battle of Kosovo has gone through a number of transformations. For example, though early chronicles of the battle did not specify the name of Sultan Murad's assassin, one later version asserts that one of a small group of Lazar's soldiers slipped through Turkish defenses and was able to stab Murad, another affirms that Lazar himself led this group, and still another account (1497) identifies MiloKobila (or Kobiliæ or Obravitch), one of Lazar's sons-in-law, who had been accused of being a traitor prior to the battle, as the heroic assassin. (After some time, Milo was generally accepted as the actual assassin.) Perhaps most importantly, the disunity of the Balkan Slavs (even that of Lazar's own family) and the continued existence of Serbia for many decades after the battle were substantially forgotten. As a result, as Markovic (1983) has written, the memory of Kosovo came to function as a "sacred grief;" "mere mention of that name suffices to shake a Serb to the depths of his soul" (p.111) because it is associated with Serbia’s subjugation to the Ottoman Empire.

Mythologized tales of the battle were transmitted from generation to generation through a strong oral and religious tradition in Serbia, perpetuating and reinforcing Serbians' traumatized self-representations.Because Lazar had become a shared image of Serbians’ traumatized self-representation-passed down through generations-he initially had to be absolved for sealing the fate of Serbia. According to legend, Saint Ilya, in the shape of a gray falcon, appeared before Lazar on the eve of the battle with a message from the Virgin Mary. Lazar was given two choices: he could win the battle and find a kingdom on earth, or he could lose the battle, die a martyr's death, and find a kingdom in heaven. The following is a version of a Serbian folk song on Lazar's dilemma:

Dear God, what shall I do and

which kingdom should I choose?

Should I choose the Kingdom of Heaven?

Or the kingdom of earth?

If I choose the kingdom,

the kingdom of the earth,

the earthly kingdom is of short duration,

and the Heavenly is from now to eternity.

               (qtd. in Markovic, 1983, p.114).

Naturally, the legend affirms that, being a devoutly religious person, Lazar chose defeat and death. As the myth of  Lazar as religious martyr spread, icons in which he was depicted as a Christ-like figure began to appear in Serbian churches and monasteries.

By propagating this legend, Serbians collectively tried to deny the shame and humiliation of the defeat at Kosovo. But, under Ottoman control, Serbians’ helplessness and victimization could not be denied, for they had no power to bring back their glorious past. So they clung to – and identified with – the martyrdom of the legend. In fact, that sense of martyrdom fit well with their pre-Ottoman perception of themselves. Even during the Nemanjiæ period, Serbians believed that they had sacrificed themselves for the other Christians of Europe since they had served as a "buffer" against the advancing Muslim Turks. The Greek Orthodox Serbians, however, felt they had received no appreciation from their Roman Catholic neighbors in Europe for their "sacrifice."


The Ottomans did not directly force the Serbians to convert to Islam en masse – except for the youngsters they collected to go through the devşirme, a process through which a Christian youth was taken away from his family to become a Muslim and educated so as to serve the sultan. After the Ottomans moved into Balkan territory, "The Orthodox Patriarch himself testified in a letter to the Pope in 1385, that the Sultan left to his church complete liberty of action" (Kinross, 1977, p.59), and even during the reign of Murad I, the seeds of a multicultural, multireligious, and multilingual Ottoman Empire had been sown. It is nevertheless true that "in the Ottoman Empire everyone was equal, but the Muslims were more equal" (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994, p.64), and some Slavs did become Muslims over the course of the first two centuries of Ottoman rule – especially in Bosnia, a "gray area"  between Orthodox and Roman Catholic influence. During the Ottoman period these ancestors of today's Bosnian Muslims became middle- and upper-middle-class city dwellers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while peasants in Serbia and Croatia remained Orthodox and Roman Catholic. By the middle of the sixteenth century, half of the population of Bosnia was Muslim, and Sarajevo was nearly all Muslim.

Among those who remained Christian, the idea that Prince Lazar – and by extension the Serbians as a group – had chosen a kingdom in Heaven rather than a kingdom on earth remained alive in a rather covert fashion, except during some rebellions such as the one in 1804-1815. The Embracing their identity as victims, Serbs glorified their supposed persecution in songs such as this one:

 Drink, Serbs, of God's glory,

and fulfill the Christian law;
and even though we have lost our kingdom,
let us not lose our souls.
(in Markovic, 1983, p.116).

As a result of sharing traumatized self-images pertaining to the same "chosen trauma," then, Serbians held onto an identity of victimhood and became "perennial mourners" (Volkan and Zintl, 1993) of the loss at Kosovo. Of course, the reality that their territory was occupied by the Ottomans supported this shared perception, and the Church and folk singers effectively kept the chosen trauma in public awareness. June 28, the day of the Battle of Kosovo, was commemorated as St. Vitus Day and through the centuries became the subject of other legends that strengthened the victimized group identity. One folk story that sprang up, for example, asserted that the flowers on the mountainous plain of the Kosovo battlefield were "crying" – referring to the fact that their stems are bent and so make the flowers appear to be bowing their heads in grief.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, as the decline of the Ottoman Empire coincided with the awakening of nationalism in Europe, other aspects of the Lazar and Kosovo legends became more readily observable. Lazar had been transformed from an ineffective leader to a saint and martyr, but now Lazar and Miloš's images gradually changed from those of victims and tragic figures to those of heroes, and ultimately, of avengers. Whereas paintings and icons of Lazar and Miloš from the Renaissance typically depicted them as saintly or Christ-like, for example, some from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century featured them as increasingly strong and warrior-like figures. Whether a shared sense of victimization or a shared sense of revenge, however, there would be no collective Serbian identity outside the context of the symbol of  Kosovo. Mothers began to greet their children as the "avengers of Kosovo." The direct and indirect message was this:  reverse not only the shame and humiliation, but also the grief and helplessness within the shared self-representation.

In 1878, after much political scheming as well as many wars, the Serbians (as well as Montenegrins) were declared independent from the Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Berlin. The treaty, however, placed them under the control of Austria-Hungary, which in turn tried to suppress Serbia's "Kosovo spirit." Serbia soon found itself embroiled in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, but was finally able to "liberate” Kosovo after more than 500 years. A young soldier later recalled this event:
The single sound of that word – Kosovo – caused an indescribable excitement.
This one word pointed to the black past-five centuries. In it exists the whole of our sad past-the tragedy
of Prince Lazar and the entire Serbian people…

Each of us created for himself a picture of Kosovo while we were still in the cradle.
Our mothers lulled us to sleep with the songs of Kosovo,
and in our schools our teachers never ceased in their stories of Lazar and Milo.

My God, what awaited us! To see a liberated Kosovo…
When we arrived on Kosovo ...
The spirits of Lazar, Milo and all the Kosovo martyrs gaze on us.
 (Vojincki Glasnik, June 28, 1932, qtd. in Emmert [1990, pp.133-134]).
Cvijiæ (1966) supports the idea that such identification with the martyrs of Kosovo was an attempt to reverse felt humiliation and helplessness: for a soldier "to kill many Turks means not only to avenge his ancestors but also to ease the pains which he himself feels" (Emmert 1990, p.135).

Less than two years after Kosovo's liberation, on St. Vitus’ Day 1914, a Bosnian Serb named Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his pregnant wife in Sarajevo, precipitating the start of World War I. What is known about Principe is that as a teenager he was filled with the transformed images of Lazar and Miloš as avengers (as were most other Serbian youngsters) (Emmert 1990). Although Serbia was "free," the Austro-Hungarian Empire exerted significant influence over much of the region after the Ottomans left. In Princip's mind, it appears that the old and new "oppressors" were condensed, and the desire for revenge was transferred to the Austro-Hungarian heir-apparent.  

After World War I, the attempt to bring all southern Slavs into one kingdom finally succeeded and the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was founded, known later as Yugoslavia ("land of the Southern Slavs," distinguishing these peoples from northern Slavs such as Poles, Slovakians, and Romanians). Yugoslavia was formed of five "lands": Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. As one might expect, the kingdom was fragmented by frequent quarrels. After World War II (what happened in the Nazi period is another story which reveals much about the present day Serbian-Croat-Muslim enmities, but beyond my scope here), Yugoslavia was reorganized as a Communist state with Marshall Josip Broz Tito as its head. The new Yugoslavia included the original five "lands," now called republics, plus Macedonia. Kosovo and Vojvodina, in southern and northern Serbia, respectively, remained "autonomous" republics.
Under the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and others lived together in relative, though not constant, peace; in the late 1960s and early 1970s, for instance, Croat nationalists demanded the formation of an independent Croatia. To combat such problems, the Communists attempted to create a "Yugoslav man" similar to the Soviet ideal of "Soviet man" in which all peoples were considered equal and connected through the higher objectives of Communist ideology. Prince Lazar's representation was officially degraded as a "symbol of reactionary nationalism" (Kaplan 1993, p.39); in Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than one-fourth of all marriages were mixed and less than three percent of all Muslims attended prayers in a mosque (Vulliamy, 1994). But, as we now know, each group in Yugoslavia strongly held onto its own identity rather than becoming a single "Yugoslavian" people. After Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 introduction of glasnost and perestroika in the U.S.S.R., the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia began to shake as each group began to ask "Who are we now?" and “How are we different from others?"
The reactivation of a chosen trauma:
In April 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, then a Communist bureaucrat, was attending a meeting of three hundred party delegates in Kosovo. At the time, only % 10 of the population in Kosovo was Serbian; the majorities, as it is today, were Albanian Muslims. During the meeting a crowd of Serbs and Montenegrins tried to force their way into the hall. They wanted to express their grievances about hardships they were experiencing in Kosovo, but the local police blocked and prohibited the crowd's entry. At that moment, Milosevic stepped forward and said: "Nobody, either now or in the future, has the right to beat you." The crowd responded in a frenzy, spontaneously singing "Hej Sloveni" (the national anthem) and shouting "We want freedom! We will not give up Kosovo!"  In turn, Milosevic was excited; he stayed in the building until dawn – 13 hours later – listening to their tales of victimization and their desire to reverse shame, humiliation, and helplessness.

Milosevic apparently came out of this experience a transformed person, clad in the "armor" of Serbian nationalism; he would later declare in a speech that Serbs in Kosovo are not a minority since "Kosovo is Serbia and will always be Serbia." I do not have sufficient data to make a sophisticated attempt at understanding Milosevic's inner world or to know whether this transformation occurred suddenly. The information that is available, however, does offer some insight into Milosevic, the second son born to an Orthodox priest during the Nazi occupation of  1941. A loner, aloof, humorless, and self-centered, he comes from a severely dysfunctional family. When he was seven, his favorite uncle killed himself with a bullet to the head. When he was twenty-one his father did the same. When he was in his early thirties, his mother hung herself in the family sitting room (Vulliamy 1994). Those who know him describe him as alternately angry and depressed. He married his teenage sweetheart, but is not known to have many other lasting and trusting relationships. When Milosevic became President of Serbia in 1992, a saying in Belgrade went something like this:
                                                                                                    "Have pity on the person whom Milosevic has called a friend."

It was this Milosevic who, with his allies and minions, unleashed Serbian nationalism in the last decade of the 20th century; one episode in particular demonstrates how he did so. According to historians, about one year after Lazar’s execution, a tomb was completed for him in the Ravanica monastery, and he was declared a saint. When Ottoman rule reached Ravanica, Lazar's remains were moved to Frushka Gora, northwest of Belgrade. In 1889, the 500th Anniversary of Kosovo plans for moving Lazar's mummified body back to Ravanica were discussed, but never materialized. As the 600th Anniversary approached, however, Milosevic and others in his circle were determined to bring Lazar's body out of "exile." Lazar's mummified body was placed in a coffin and taken "on tour" to every Serbian village and town, where he was received by huge crowds of mourners dressed in black (Kaplan 1993).
As a result, Serbs began to feel the defeat in Kosovo as if it had occurred only yesterday (a “time collapse” initiated by Serbian leadership), an outcome facilitated by the fact that the "chosen trauma" had been kept alive throughout the centuries in legend and folk belief. As Serbs greeted Lazar's body, they cried and wailed and gave speeches declaring that they would never allow such a defeat to occur again; sharing the affects associated with traumatized self-images invisibly connected all Serbs more closely to each other. Although it is unclear precisely what Milosevic (with the help of the Serbian church and certain academics) consciously intended to achieve, he apparently reactivated Lazar's images in Serbs’ minds so that grieving his defeat at the Battle of Kosovo could at last be accomplished, and so that reversing the helplessness, humiliation, and shame created by the 600-year-old trauma could finally be completed. Serbs began, as a result of his actions, to develop similar self-images that incorporated a new sense of entitlement to revenge.

As the 600th Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo approached, Milosevic ordered the building of a huge monument on a hill overlooking the battlefield. Made of red stone representing blood (Kaplan 1993), it stands 100 feet over the "grieving" flowers and is surrounded by artillery shell-shaped cement pillars inscribed with a sword and the dates 1389-1989. On the tower are written Lazar's words before the battle calling every Serbian man to fight the Turks. If a Serb fails to respond to this call, Lazar's words warn: "He will not have a child, neither male or female, and he will not have fertile land where crops grow;" as some photographs reveal, this call to battle was reprinted on the T-shirts of many of those present at the Field of the Black Birds on the anniversary itself. By building the monument linking 1389 with 1989, Milosevic was "re-sending" Lazar's ancient message in the present. The message to the Serbian men was clear:
                           "Either fight ‘the Turks’ – Muslims – or lose your manliness!"
At the celebration, Milosevic;
                                 "took the podium from dancing maidens in traditional folk costume and transported the crowd to heights of frenzied adoration with a simple message: 'never again would Islam subjugate the Serbs'" (Vulliamy 1994, p.51).

Riding this wave of nationalism, Milosevic grew in prominence. In 1990, the six Yugoslav Republics held elections and Communists were defeated everywhere except Serbia and Montenegro. In Serbia, Milosevic was elected as head of the Communists, now called the Serbian Socialist Party. In 1991, Milosevic summoned Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serbs' leader, and others to meet with him to discuss the future of the republics. In June 1992, after disposing of his "friend" and mentor Ivan Stambolic, then State President, whom he had accused of betraying the Serbs in Kosovo, Milosevic was elected president of the third " Yugoslavia" (the Serb-Montenegrin Federation.)

Meanwhile, Turks once more became the "clear and present" enemy. Hasan Aygün, who ran the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade, has described how he was considered "public enemy number one" in the Serbian capital city. Everywhere he went Serbs asked him "Why are you [Turks] planning to invade us?" Mr. Aygün, thinks that almost every Serb believed that a Turkish invasion was imminent, and he feared for his physical safety because of the time collapse during this period. One of his observations particularly interested me: he said that many Serbian youngsters had developed a new game – playing Russian roulette with pistols loaded with live ammunition. Unsurprisingly, many of these teenagers had to be taken to the hospital dead or with head wounds. To me, this shared new "game" suggests an identification or attempted identification with Lazar's image carried through generations. Like the Lazar of legend, these youngsters were experiencing two choices: death/martyrdom or life/revenge on Turks.

Serbs now experienced Bosnian Muslims as an extension of the Ottoman Empire, and often referred to them as "Turks." There is, of course, a certain truth to this perception since Bosnian Muslims played a significant role in Ottoman Turkish history; one of the most famous Ottoman Grand Viziers was a Serbian raised in the devşirme, and many Bosnian Muslim epic songs refer to their glories under the Ottomans (Butler 1993.) Within the emotional atmosphere resulting from a time collapse, however, the Serbs, especially those living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, began to feel entitled to do to Bosnian Muslims what they believed the Ottoman Turks had done to them.
Before the ethnic cleansing and systematic rape of Bosnian Muslim women began, Serbian propaganda increasingly focused on inflaming the idea that the Ottomans, now symbolized by the Bosnian Muslims, would return. One piece of propaganda against Bosnian Muslims read:

"By order of the Islamic fundamentalist from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women from 17 to 40 years of age are being separated out and subjected to special treatment. According to their sick plans going back many years, these women have to be impregnated by orthodox Islamic seeds in order to raise a generation of janissaries [Ottoman troops] on the territory they surely consider to be theirs, the Islamic Republic. In other words, a fourfold crime is to be committed against the Serbian woman: to remove her from her own family, to impregnate her by undesirable seeds, to make her bear a stranger and then to take even him away from her " (Gutman 1993).

This propaganda aimed to create fear among Serbs that the Bosnian Muslims intended to resurrect the devşirme and to create a new janissary army. Though there is a kernel of truth in this idea – Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic had alluded in speeches and in print to the possibility of an Islamic enterprise in Bosnia for which he sought the help of other fundamentalist elements in Muslim countries (whether he was referring to a theoretical position or a wish is unclear) – the fear equating Bosnian Muslims with Ottoman Turks was mostly based on fantasy, for the former had virtually no military power.

Yet the massive projection of Serbs' aggression onto Bosnian Muslims was so great that it began to "boomerang" – based on the past trauma and time collapse, Serbs perceived a threat when one did not actually exist, and felt compelled to act against it. Thus the collective idea that Muslims had to be exterminated slowly began to develop. The Serbs emotionally prepared themselves to "purify" their identity of any possibility of contamination by the Ottoman Turks/Bosnian Muslims. For example, Sarajevo contained many buildings, works of art and manuscripts that reflected the city's past under the Ottomans. A precious Koran, given by the Grand Vizier Mehmet Pasha, was featured in the city's famous Gazi Hosrev library. Through the siege of Sarajevo, the Serbs attempted to erase these monuments of Bosnian Muslims’ cultural and religious heritage. Interestingly, many Bosnian Serbs who bombarded the Bosnian capital were natives of the city ( Butler 1993); in their collective regression and response to time collapse, they bombed their own city because it "needed" to be purged of any Muslim connection.

Alongside the shared fantasy that Muslims must be cleansed or exterminated was another – that the devşirme must be reversed, that the number of Serbs must be increased to carry on the battle. Hence a conscious strategy of intimidation was condensed with an unconscious one, resulting in the systematic rape of thousands of  Muslim women by Serbian soldiers. The unconscious assumption was that the child produced by the rape of a non-Serb woman would be a Serb, and not carry any of the traits of the mother. Serbs thus sought to truly reverse their victimhood both by killing young Muslim men and by replacing them with new "Serb" children. Although, as Beverly Allen (1996) notes, "Enforced pregnancy as a method of genocide makes sense only if you are ignorant about genetics. No baby born from such a crime will be only Serb. It will receive half its genetic material from its mother" (p.80), the "psychological truth" is more important than biological reality in conditions of inflamed ethnic animosities. Fact and fantasy, past and present were intimately and violently intermingled.

Final words:

I do not wish to reduce what happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the reactivation of a transgenerationally-transmitted "chosen trauma" alone. But I do want to emphasize that knowing about psychological processes, especially unconscious ones, can enlarge our understanding about how they may become the fuel to ignite the most horrible human dramas and/or to feed the fire once hostilities start. Psychoanalytic research into the transgenerational transmission of shared trauma, its activation in leader-follower relationships, and the associated phenomenon of "time collapse" can illuminate many hidden aspects of ethnic or other large group conflicts and show us how internal and external world issues become intertwined.


1-Allen, B. (1996.) Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
2- Butler, T. (1993.) Yugoslavia Mon Amour. Mind and Human Interaction. 4:120-128.

3-  Cvijic, J. (1986.) "Balkansko Poluostrvo i Juznoslevenske Zemle." Belgrade (reported in T.A. Emmert 1990.)

4- Emmert, T.A. (1990.) Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo, 1389. New York: Columbia University Press.

5- Gutman, R. (1993.) A Witness to Genocide. New York: Macmillan.

6- Kaplan, R.D. (1993.) Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History. New York: Vintage.

7- Failure of Diplomacy: The Psychoanalysis of National, Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.) Giessen: Psychosozial-Verlag. (Original in German.)

8- Markovic, M.S. (1983.) The Secret of Kosovo. Landmarks in Serbian Culture and History, (ed.), V.D. Mihailovich, pp.111-131. Pittsburg, PA: Serb National Federation.

9- Volkan, Vamık D. (1999a.) Das Versagen der Diplomatie:  Zur Psychoanalyse Nationaler, Ethnischer und Religiöser Konflikte. 

10- Volkan, Vamık D. (1999b.) Psychoanalysis and Diplomacy Part I: Individual and Large-group Identity. Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies. 1:29-55.

11- Volkan, Vamık D. (1997.)  Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

12- Volkan, V.D., and Itzkowitz, N. (1994.) Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict. Cambridgeshire, England: Eothen Press.

13- Volkan, V.D., and Zintl, E. (1993.) Life after Loss: The Lessons of Grief. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

14- Vulliamy, E. (1994.) Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
15-                L. (1977.) The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire. New York: William Morrow. 






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